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Preface 
Today, Eritreans account for one of the biggest groups of refugees seeking asylum in the 
Netherlands. At the beginning of 2016, more than 8,000 Eritrean people had already found a place 
to live somewhere in the Netherlands. But, despite their huge number, few Dutch people are aware 
of the situation in Eritrea. During discussion about the Eritrean refugees, it occurred to me that 
almost no one could actually tell what was going on in Eritrea and why so many people were 
forced to flee their homes.  
 Hence, I decided that more attention to the country of origin of these many refugees was 
required. Therefore, I dedicated my Master Thesis to exploring what exactly was going on in this 
country. Unfortunately, given the complexities of the situation, I did not at all find out what was 
exactly happening in Eritrea, but I managed to get a better understanding of one particular aspect: 
the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict from 1998 till 2000.  
 During the process of writing this Master Thesis, I became even more intrigued by the 
problems in Eritrea and the border conflict itself. Highlights in my research were the interviews 
with the Eritrean Habtom Yohannes and the Ethiopian Gizachew Soboska.  
 Furthermore, due to my interest in the border conflict, I came in contact with a former 
Eritrean refugee, now living in Amsterdam. I am currently helping him, his wife and his 3-years 
old son to become more familiar with living in the Netherlands, by supporting them in their 
learning of the Dutch language, but also through helping them with daily life aspects. Therefore, I 
became personally involved in this research and I hope to remain active in the field related to this 
issue in the future.  
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Abstract 
 
This International Studies Master Thesis adds to the existing explanations of the outbreak 
of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, from 1998 till 2000. In order to do so, 
the thesis makes use of the insights derived from the theory of Chiozza and Goemans (2011). 
This theory takes on a starting position in which an (authoritarian) leader faces domestic 
opposition. Chiozza and Goemans argue that when, in such a situation, an ‘exogenous shock’ 
favours the position of the opposition, the leader might rationally choose to use international 
conflict to secure his/her position in office.  
 Embedded in this framework, the thesis finds that the relationship between the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) has been problematic from the start, in particular because the EPLF was not 
prepared to let go its superior status. Furthermore, during the 1990s the EPLF turned into 
an authoritarian regime, centred around Isaias himself. Despite the fact that official 
opposition within Eritrea was impossible due to the repressive measures, foreign opposition 
emerged, including the ethnic minority groups of the Red Sea Afar peoples and the Kunama 
peoples, which were both supported by the Ethiopian government. At the same time, the 
balance between the EPLF and TPLF was changing; the EPLF had to accept the TPLF as 
the ‘senior partner’ as they had become the leader of a more powerful country, Ethiopia. 
This also implied that the ethnic minority groups were supported by a more powerful actor, 
which could have been the ‘exogenous shock’ that favoured the opposition, mentioned by 
Chiozza and Goemans. Therefore, Isaias might have rationally chosen to initiate the border 
war as a means to regain his power.  
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Introduction 
 
When Eritrea, finally achieved independence de jure in 1993 after a long liberation war against 
Ethiopia, it had earned the respect of many. Reasons for this were not only its extraordinary success 
of winning a war against Ethiopia (a country which had an army approximately 17 times bigger as 
their own), but also the well-functioning and the high level of organisation of the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF)1. Furthermore, the leader of the EPLF, Isaias Afeworki, was believed to 
belong to the “new generation” of African leaders, which were supposed to guide their countries 
towards prosperous democratic states (Plaut, 2002: 119-120).  
 However, in the years after the independence war, it became clear that these prospects were 
nothing more than just delusionary hopes. Under the regime of Isaias2, the EPLF failed to establish 
a well-functioning economy. Instead, it sustained a total militarisation of society, and reached high 
levels of oppression, including torturing and imprisoning. In a short time, Eritrea had become one 
of the most authoritarian states in the world (Tronvoll, 2009: 410).  
 On top of these developments, Eritrea became involved in a border conflict against its old 
enemy Ethiopia in 1998. Although the conflict officially ended in 2000, when both sides signed a 
peace agreement on 12 December in Algiers (the Algiers Agreement), the conflict still remains 
unsolved. The border between Eritrea and Ethiopia continues to be militarised and the tensions 
between both countries endure. This is causing serious problems in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
including many displaced people, high levels of violence, and debt, but it also creates instability 
in the rest of the Horn of Africa (Reid, 2011).  
 In the academic literature on this conflict, the idea persists that the border itself was a 
superficial cause of the conflict, whereas deeper, underlying issues are considered the real cause 
of war. As there are clear signs that points towards the authoritarian nature of the Eritrean regime 
as having played a decisive role within this conflict, the thesis focuses on the relatively new theory 
of Chiozza and Goemans (2011), which provides an approach from this angle. Broadly 
summarised, Chiozza and Goemans’ theory argues that in a situation in which a leader faces 
                                                          
1 The EPLF is the opposition party that had led Eritrea through the liberation war and had become the head of the 
country after the liberation war. 
2 According to common Eritrean use, people are referred to by using only their first names.  
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competition over his power, whilst an exogenous shock favours the position of the opposition, a 
leader might rationally choose to use international conflict as a means to restore his/her power.  
The thesis has two aims. Firstly, it will examine whether this theory is applicable to the 
specific context of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict. Secondly, if the theory is applicable, this 
thesis will examine, which insights on the outbreak of the conflict the theory provides.  
 By executing this research, the thesis will expand the existing knowledge on the outbreak 
of the conflict. Firstly, this is important because adequate research on this issue will serve the 
ultimate goal of the return to peace in the region. Furthermore, it will raise awareness of this topic 
within the international community (Ogbazghi, 2015: 467).   
 However, the thesis does not intend to provide an exhaustive framework on the outbreak 
of the theory. This will be unattainable given the multidimensional character of the conflict (Reid, 
2003: 370). The thesis does also not aim to deny or to overrule the existing explanations, the thesis 
rather aims to be an extra understanding by focussing on the authoritarian aspects of the conflict.  
 The thesis begins by outlining the current state of research, which elaborates on existing 
explanations. Thereafter, the methodology is explained, where specific attention is paid to the 
relevant content of Chiozza and Goemans’ theory. This theoretical framework will serve as a 
guideline throughout the research project.  
Firstly, the historical development of the EPLF itself as well as its relationship with the 
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is explained. This forms the basis of the current 
Ethiopian regime. This relationship was featured by a discourse in which the EPLF assumes 
themselves as the superior partner. Thereafter, the current positional situation of Eritrea is 
explained, in which the nature of the authoritarian regime is thoroughly discussed. It is explained 
how the domestic opposition within Eritrea was oppressed, but that the opposition had to find their 
ways to organise themselves abroad. In particular, in the years prior to the conflict, two ethnic 
minority groups had emerged with the assistance of Ethiopia. Finally, the thesis focusses on the 
changing balance between the EPLF and the TPLF, in which the TPLF transformed to the superior 
actor. This can be explained as the ‘exogenous shock’ mentioned by the theory of Chiozza and 
Goemans, as the TPLF backed the two minority opposition groups against Isaias’ regime. 
Therefore, this theory is able to partly explain the occurrence of the border conflict in 1998.  
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State of the Research 
The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea officially ‘ended’ in 2000 through a peace 
agreement, which was called the Algiers Agreement. The Algiers Agreement was established with 
assistance of multiple mediators3, in particular the African Union Organisation (AUO) and the 
United Nations (UN). Following the Algiers Agreement, two commissions were set up to support 
the operations; the Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC) and the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
Claims Commission (EECC). The former, the EEBC, was set up to demarcate a new border 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, while the latter, the EECC, was created to assess the damage caused 
by the conflict.  
 Although Eritrea and Ethiopia had agreed on the Algiers Agreement, the EEBC 
experienced obstruction from both countries during their work. When the EEBC presented their 
final proposal for the newly demarcated border in 2003, it was not accepted, despite both sides 
agreeing that the ruling of the EEBC would be final (EEBC, Statement 2006). The involved 
commissions concluded that the problems related to the border remained unresolved and that, 
therefore, the conflict still continues. 
 However, it is argued by many authors that the Algiers Agreement not only failed because 
the border demarcation remained disputed, but, more importantly, because the Agreement did not 
focus on the right problems. To understand this crucial point, it is imperative to have a closer look 
on the Agreement. 
 The Algiers Agreement treated the war as a border conflict and assuming that the dispute 
over the common border was the key source of the conflict. The Agreement embedded this border 
problem into a framework of three main issues. Firstly, Eritrea and Ethiopia had different visions 
on the geographical location of their common border. Therefore, they suspected each other of 
administering their own territory. During the war, this suspicion extended to attacking and 
occupying rightful property. This led to the outbreak of the war, since both states felt the need to 
defend their national sovereignty. Secondly, resource competition and territorial acquisition played 
a decisive role in the escalation of the conflict. In particular, Eritrea was assumed to be seeking for 
fertile land, whereas Ethiopia pursued access to the port of Assab. A third and final issue was due 
                                                          
3 Including the European Union, the United States of America, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
(EEBC, 2006) 
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to self-determination exercised by Isaias who aimed to show, and thereby reinforce, Eritrea’s 
power through the means of this conflict.  
  Before contesting this perception of the conflict, it is important to keep in mind that this 
is not to deny the disputes over the border being a driver for the conflict. The Algiers Agreement 
was indeed right in emphasizing the border as a problematic issue as there were multiple 
difficulties related to the border. This included an ambiguous colonial legacy, but also the symbolic 
importance of Badme4, which was located on the common border. Furthermore, the border dispute 
highly affected the lives of the people living in the disputed areas (Peninou, 1998: 506-507).  
 However, the border issue alone cannot sufficiently explain the outbreak of the war. The 
disagreement over the border had already existed for many decades, but in previous years this issue 
was indefinitely postponed in order to go on with ‘more important’ issues. The fact that this issue 
was ignored for a long time implies that there must be other underlying causes for the sudden 
outbreak of the conflict. The same can be argued for the resource competition, as there was no 
radical change of conditions regarding the resources. Furthermore, why and how would a border 
conflict reinforce Eritrea’s power (Stevens, 2003: 120-122)? So, as Plaut rightly argues “By taking 
this stance they [the Algiers Agreement] swept under the carpet a host of problems that underlay 
the outbreak of hostilities” (2001: 126).  
 If the dispute over the border only explains the superficial cause of the conflict then which 
issues have caused the real conflict between the two countries? Abbink provides the essential 
guideline to this question by explaining that international treaties often fail to rightly interpret the 
deep-rooted causes of the conflict. Therefore, Abbink emphasizes the importance of taking into 
account the ‘realities on the ground’. These consist of mainly, although not exclusively, historical 
context, local power settings and struggles, local perceptions on territoriality and governance, and 
socio-ethnic composition of the disputed regions (2009: 141-145). Hence, to shed light on the 
complexities related to the outbreak of the conflict, it is necessary to further examine the deeper 
contextual aspects related to the conflict.  
 The scholars that examine the so-called ‘deep-rootedness’ of the conflict focus on the 
problematic relationship between the two parties that form the head of the respective states. For 
Eritrea, this is currently the People’s Front for Democracy of Justice (PFDJ), which has emerged 
from the EPLF. Ethiopia is governed by the political coalition the Ethiopian People’s 
                                                          
4 Badme is a town, which was (and: is) the focus of the border conflict.  
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Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which, in practice, is controlled by the TPLF. Both the 
EPLF and the TPLF emerged during the liberation war against the military regime of Mengistu 
(1961 – 1991) and had worked together in achieving their common objective of overthrowing the 
Ethiopian government, which was firstly ruled by emperor Haile Selassie (till 1974) and, 
thereafter, by the Derg5.  
 Gilkes explains that the relationship between the EPLF and TPLF was problematic since 
the beginning6 because they had contrasting ideological, political, and military approaches. 
However, as they pursued the same goal during the liberation war, the leaders of both parties 
pragmatically decided to work together, which resulted in an intense cooperation. Despite this 
intensive teamwork, the problems between the two parties were never adequately addressed and 
no long-term strategy had developed. Therefore, Gilkes argues that the troubles seemed inevitable 
and the conflict occurred as a result of this (1999: 11-20).  
 Both Young (1996) and Reid (2003) agree that the history of a problematic relationship 
between the two parties was important for the outbreak of the conflict. Within this framework, 
Young explains that the EPLF had developed a superiority complex and that, therefore, they had 
a habit of downgrading the TPLF, which eventually caused problems. Furthermore, Reid explains 
that due to the EPLF’s superiority complex, the EPLF insisted on remaining silent on their 
ideological and other problems with the TPLF. This did obviously counteract a workable solution.  
 However, without denying the importance of these issues, they cannot sufficiently explain 
the sudden outbreak of the conflict. Although a problematic relationship between neighbouring 
countries is indeed difficult, it does not imply that a peaceful coexistence is either impossible or 
preferable by both sides. Therefore, these historical problems should be conceived as underlying 
tensions, rather than actual causes of the conflict.  
 On top of the emphasis on historical problems in the relationship between the EPLF and 
the TPLF, different authors have also focussed on their economic relationship during the 1990s. 
After the liberation war in 1991, several trade and other economic agreements emerged between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. The influence of these agreements on both countries led to a wide array of 
contrasting visions. For example, Tesfai argues that these agreements favoured the position of 
                                                          
5 The short name of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army that ruled 
Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987.  
6 The EPLF and TPLF started to cooperate around the 1980s. Their initial cooperation is explained in the section 
“Historical Background”.  
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Ethiopia relative to Eritrea (1999: 10), whereas Trivelli argues the contrary explains that Ethiopia 
aimed to establish favourable conditions for Eritrea as this would serve their ultimate goal of 
integrating Eritrea again in a political federation. Hence, there was a possibility that Eritrea would 
attack Ethiopia in order to emphasize its independence (1999: 17). 
 Peninou suggests another economic aspect as an important trigger for the outbreak of the 
border conflict. He explains that a monetary union existed between the two countries before 1997 
and that their common border did not have many practical implications. However, this changed 
when Eritrea introduced their new currency, the nakfa, in 1997, which suddenly turned the border 
into a concrete reality (1998: 505).  
 However, as is also argued for the historical relationship between the EPLF and TPLF, 
these ideas explain underlying tensions instead of actual causes. Although they provide plausible 
assumptions, they do not explain how this led to the outbreak of a war. Therefore, as there are 
many contrasting understandings on the impact of the economic agreements, one can conclude that 
further research is imperative.  
 Stevens embraces a different perspective by emphasizing the problematic leadership of 
both Meles and Isaias. He argues that, because both countries not successfully transformed into 
well-functioning democracies, there were no established institutions that could protect their 
respective positions as a leader. Therefore, although the outbreak of the war itself was an accident 
according to Stevens, this war was then used as a means to distract the attention from themselves 
and the fragility of their position in office. They achieved this through nationalistic and aggressive 
foreign policies, which even reinforced the conflict. Hence, the border war served to benefit the 
stability of both regimes (2003: 121-130). 
 This explanation is reaffirmed by Lyons, who states that both states uses the war as a 
justification of their oppressive policies against potential opposition. This came as a scapegoat to 
both regimes who had become increasingly authoritarian in the 1990’s. Furthermore, the war itself 
caused large internal opposition, and Lyons explains that “If the border demarcation process can 
commence, as Asmara has demanded, Isaias will get a short-term boost in his popularity, but will 
inevitably face difficult internal political issues in the longer term” (2009: 171). This implies that 
it would not have been beneficial to Isaias to end the war.  
 Finally, Abbink provides the most comprehensive vision on the start of the conflict. He 
emphasizes the importance of the difficulties within the relationship between the EPLF and TPLF 
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and, additionally, the importance of their common history. However, he rightly argues that “these 
issues do not explain the current border conflict, but indicate some of the inherent tensions of the 
two regimes” (1998: 556). However, he then explains that these tensions were a result of the 
authoritarian nature of the two regimes.  
 Furthermore, Abbink suggests that the economic weakness of Eritrea could be a direct 
cause of the conflict. He explains that Eritrea was economically dependent of Ethiopia and, by 
initiating a conflict, the state aimed to regain a favourable trade status. The EPLF attacked Ethiopia 
because they pursued to achieve regional dominance, privileged economic relations, and 
weakening of the Ethiopian regime. Therefore, Abbink successfully combines the three main 
issues as he focusses on the history and relationship between the EPLF and TPLF; the elite rule, 
the lack of democratic institutions and the economic problems of Eritrea (556-559).  
But, although this explanation is both encompassing and convincing, it still leaves some 
important questions open. For example, how are these different underlying tensions interrelated? 
And, why did these tensions escalate into a conflict? In order to answer these questions, further 
research along the lines of Abbink’s thinking is required.   
As Abbink explains, the tensions had come together under the authoritarian rule of the 
respective leaders. Therefore, in order to find out whether this can highlight the complex relations 
between the different issues, it makes sense to further examine it by focussing on the authoritarian 
character of the conflict.  
Chiozza and Goemans (2011) provide a useful theory to execute such research as their 
framework embeds the occurrence of a conflict in the authoritarian character of the respective 
leader. This theory is further explained in the following section.   
Research Methodology 
 
Some conflict studies explain that inter-state war is ‘ex-post inefficient’ for the respective states. 
In more easy terms, the ‘pie’ to be divided among the involved states is always smaller after a war, 
than it was before the respective war. This implies that preventing, or not going to war, would be 
more beneficial to all states than going to war. This raises the obvious question: why does war still 
occur, despite its costliness?  
 Chiozza and Goemans (2011) adequately address this question by focussing on ‘leaders’ 
as their subject of research, instead of the common-used ‘states’. In their research, they show that, 
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although war is indeed ex-post inefficient for states, it is not necessarily true for the leaders of the 
respective states. The reason for this is that the costs of a war do convert to the states, but do not 
automatically translate into political and/or personal costs for the leaders of these states (Chiozza 
and Goemans, 2004: 604-605).  
 By focussing on leaders in war, Chiozza and Goemans base their theory on the main idea 
of diversionary war theories (Bueno de Mesquita et al, (2003), Simmel, (1989, 1955), Coser 
(1956), Mueller (1973), and Levy (1989)), which argue that a leaders’ ultimate goal is to retain 
their position in office. These leaders will, therefore, implement only those policies that would 
serve this aim. This implies that leaders base their decision to go to war on the estimated effects 
this would have for their position in office, not necessarily the effects on the state.  
 Chiozza and Goemans develop this hypothesis further by focussing not only on a leader’s 
position in office, but also on the manner by which the leader could lose office and its subsequent 
consequences. Chiozza and Goemans explain that the manner and consequences of losing office 
can be divided in two broad categories: a regular removal and a forcible removal. A regular 
removal process means that there are established political institutions that guarantee the leader a 
safe retirement. However, a forcible removal means that such institutions are lacking and the leader 
could face personal punishment after losing office. 
 The manner and consequences of losing office are, in general, linked to a state’s regime. 
For example, in democracies, institutions that guarantee a regular removal from office are 
commonplace. On the other hand, in autocratic regimes, for example, a forcible removal is more 
likely to occur, leaving leaders with the fear of personal punishment. 
 But, how do these ideas improve our understanding of the border conflict? Firstly, Chiozza 
and Goemans describe a situation in which a leader faces competition or opposition against his 
power, while an ‘exogenous shock’ favours the position of the other party. In a state where 
established institutions exist, a leader would be likely to make concessions towards the opposition, 
rather than choosing to initiate a conflict. This is because they do not have to fear personal risks 
after a regular removal, while an international conflict might involve negative personal 
consequences for the leader. On the contrary, when leaders face a forcible removal in this situation, 
they have to worry about personal punishment if they would lose office. In this case, they will be 
unlikely to make concessions towards the opposition. Instead, the leader might then choose to ‘use’ 
initiating an international conflict as a means to either directly fight against his/her opposition or 
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to seek gains other forms of gains of the conflict. Such gains could for example be potential 
opportunities to show leadership capabilities during the war or the possibility to move away the 
attention from a leader’s own crisis.  
 The theory provides three main mechanisms that further explain this logic. (1) The 
‘fighting for survival’ mechanism explains that leaders who face an increased risk of a forcible 
removal, might rationally choose to initiate a conflict. This is because the participation in an 
international conflict itself would reduce the risk of a forcible removal because it could serve as a 
means to fight domestic opposition. Important pathways through which this could happen for this 
research project in specific are (a) leaders can use international conflict to directly deal with 
opposition groups that have gathered abroad, and (b) an international conflict can help to boost a 
leader’s legitimacy because it provides him/her with opportunities to show his/her capabilities as 
a leader in war.  
 (2) The ‘gambling for survival’, focusses on the outcome of the conflict instead. This 
mechanism shows that a leader, who already faces a high risk of a forcible removal, could 
rationally choose to initiate a war, as losing involves the same consequences as not waging a war.  
 (3) The ‘peace through security’ mechanism shows that when the hazard of losing office 
in a regular manner increases, leaders will be less prone to initiate a conflict.  
 As a side note, Chiozza and Goemans provide extensive empirical evidence for their 
theory, in the form of different datasets with statistical information on political leaders. In 
particular, their dataset Archigos is important, as it contains comprehensive empirical evidence on 
leaders from 188 countries, from 1975 till 2004 (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009: 270). 
  
 This research is embedded in the theoretical framework by using the following main 
questions/aspects as guideline. Given that the start of the border conflict is complicated, it is 
imperative to examine whether Eritrea or Ethiopia initiated the war. This stance will enable one 
to, focus on the right side of the conflict and to apply the theoretical insights on the right party.  
As the thesis finds that the border conflict is initiated mainly7 by Eritrea, it is necessary to 
analyse the internal political and institutional situation within Eritrea. The existence and the 
effectiveness of Eritrea’s institutions and legislation related to Isaias’ (“the leader”) position 
                                                          
7 The vision that Eritrea initiated the conflict should be nuanced, as is further explained in paragraph “the start of the 
war: who initiated the conflict?”  
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require examination. Namely, when it appears that Isaias’ position is not protected by strong 
institutions, the leader is more likely to face a forcible removal than a regular removal. This affects 
his decision making regarding opposition. According to Chiozza’s and Goemans’ theory, a leader 
who faces a forcible removal is less likely to make concessions towards the opposition and rather 
chooses to initiate an international conflict. 
In order to know whether Isaias is likely to initiate an international conflict in response to 
the opposition, one also needs to examine whether there exists opposition. Furthermore, if an 
opposition can be identified, one will need to examine if the opposition is willing to challenge 
Isaias’ position. In the latter case, the theory describes that a leader would be likely to initiate a 
conflict. 
However, the theory also argues that a leader who is insecure in his position is unlikely to 
initiate an international conflict in a stable situation. The decision to initiate a conflict is mostly 
preceded by an ‘exogenous’ shock that favours the position of the opposition. Hence, it is 
necessary to examine whether or not an exogenous shock occurred in this context. If such a shock 
did occur, it is important to understand what it was. 
By following this guideline, the thesis aims to answer the research question whether the 
respective theory is applicable to the outbreak of the border conflict. If this is the case, this thesis 
will examine what insights the theory provides on the outbreak of this conflict.  
 
This research project is mainly a qualitative analysis, based on both archival, primary 
sources and secondary sources. The secondary sources are used to embed the analysis within a 
specific context. Hence, they are primarily used in the paragraphs on the historical developments 
and situational information. The primary sources are used for the actual research.   
 The commissions concerned with resolving the border conflict were based in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. As a result, the PCA has provided important 
primary sources for this thesis. The information includes statements, press releases, partial and 
final awards, decisions, and summaries. Other primary sources related to these commissions were 
compiled in the books Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents (Walta 
Information Center: 2001) and Litigating War (Murphy et al., 2013).  
 In addition, the news media provides a wealth of information on the situation in both states 
at the outbreak and throughout the duration of the conflict. This thesis has made use of the 
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www.AllAfrica.com website, which provides a collection of the most important news channels in 
Africa.  
 Furthermore, most of the information on the opposition groups used in this thesis is also 
available online. The most important website for information on the opposition is 
www.awate.com. However, many opposition groups have also their own website where they 
provide information. In addition to this, international human right organisations, think tanks, 
resource centres, and diaspora groups also provide information on the political opposition parties 
involved in the border dispute. 
 Moreover, the thesis makes use of interviews with two people from each of the respective 
countries: Gizachew Sobokas (Ethiopia) and Habtom Yohannes (Eritrea). Both interviewees are 
active in different organisations, which provided a good guideline to carry out this research. The 
transcripts of both interviews can be found under Appendix 1 and 2 at the end of this thesis.  
An important library for the secondary sources, but also for some primary sources, is the 
African Studies Centre (ASC) at Leiden University. In particular, this library contains important 
contemporary journals (secondary sources), including the Journal of Eritrean Studies, Ethiopian 
Register and Ethioscope. Other secondary sources were based in the regular library of Leiden 
University.  
 This method has also encountered some difficulties. Firstly, as the thesis examines 
authoritarian countries, the media and other sources of information were often not trustworthy 
and/or biased. Furthermore, as criticism and opposition were oppressed, many sources were not 
accessible because they were hidden in secrecy. Finally, many sources related to this issue are 
written in non-Western languages and could, therefore, not be used for the thesis.  
The Outbreak of the Conflict 
 
1. The start of the war: who initiated the conflict?  
 
In order to correctly apply the theory on the conflict, it is imperative to know who initiated the 
border conflict. However, this is problematic for the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea because 
there was no formal declaration of war. This makes the start of the conflict complex and disputed 
by both sides. The majority of the mainstream sources acknowledges Eritrea, and hence Isaias, as 
the initiator of the conflict. The thesis agrees with this vision, whilst emphasizing the importance 
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to nuance this view. To illustrate these nuances, the visions of the three main parties in this matter 
– Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) – are discussed in the following.  
According to the Ethiopian perspective, the war started at the moment that Eritrea invaded 
Ethiopian territory on the 12th of May, 1998. Ethiopia argues that it did not expect an attack like 
this. Evidence for this statement follows from the information that there were only some militia 
and police forces of the Ethiopian side present at the moment of the attack (EECC, 2004: 5). 
Besides, Meles repeatedly emphasized that Ethiopia sought for ways to peacefully respond to the 
aggressive invasion of their neighbouring country, such as the economic measure to call the 
Ethiopian ships not to go to the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assad (Panafrican News Agency, 
26 May 1998). However, it soon became clear to Meles that there was no other option to defend 
the country than resorting to violence (Walta Information Center, 2001: 133-138). As the cause 
for the Eritrean aggression, Meles points towards Issaias’ aggressive territorial ambitions and his 
aim to expose his personal power (Walta Information Center, 2001: 145-158). 
 Eritrea provides a different story of the same conflict. The Eritrean government 
acknowledges that on the 12th May they attacked areas which were previously administered by 
Ethiopia. However, they do not conceive their attack as an invasion, but rather as an “act of 
retaking” of what was already theirs given that the colonial treaties show the disputed areas belong 
to Eritrea (Walta Information Center, 2001: 190-198). Furthermore, Issaias explains that Ethiopia 
have been committing hostilities across their common border since July 1997 (Walta Information 
Center, 2001: 225). These hostilities included the killing of eight Eritrean soldiers, as showed in 
Table 1. Therefore, he argues that Ethiopia should be considered as the party who started the war. 
The EEBC and the EECC, both based in the PCA in The Hague, state that at least two 
Eritrean brigades of armed soldiers, supported by tanks and artillery, entered areas which were 
administered by Ethiopia on 5.30 AM, 12 May 1998 (EECC, 2004: 5). The PCA disregards 
Eritrea’s arguments to justify this behaviour for two reasons. Firstly, this is because it is against 
international law to use violence as a means to resolve a border conflict. Secondly, the PCA argues 
that these hostilities were too minor to justify the Eritrean attack on May 12. They do, however, 
acknowledge that there were hostilities across the border in the period before 12th May. Therefore, 
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the PCA decided that the Eritrean attack was against the principle of jus ad bellum and a violation 
of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of United Nations (EECC, 2004: 5). 
 
Although this thesis agrees with the PCA in appointing Eritrea as the initiator of the 
conflict, it is important to make some nuances to this view. Firstly, after the conflict, the EEBC 
decided that Eritrea was right in their claim that the territories they invaded were their lawful 
property. In addition, the theoretical decision that the small hostilities before the 12th May did not 
matter, does not match the realities on the ground. For example, it is not explainable to the affected 
people that the eight Eritrean soldiers who were shot by Ethiopia on 6th and 7th May were not 
important (EECC, 2004: 3). Furthermore, over the course of the war, Ethiopia showed itself as 
being prone to war. By following the news press on the first few months of this war, it becomes 
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evident that Ethiopia was responsible for many major attacks and, thereby, escalating the conflict, 
see Table 1. This behaviour does not really fit a party who claims to ‘only defend themselves’.  
To conclude, the mainstream view that Eritrea started the war should not be overturned 
since evidence shows that Eritrea was violating international law with their attack on the 12th May. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that reality was more complex; it is too black or white to 
argue that Eritrea started the war, since the truth is nuanced. Nevertheless, the thesis focusses on 
the Eritrean side, as they were the actual initiators of the conflict. This ‘theoretical decision’ is 
further discussed in the section ‘Discussion’.  
 
2. Historical Context 
 
Before further examining the actual outbreak of the conflict, it is necessary to pay attention 
to the historical development of the EPLF and its relationship with Ethiopia. The historical context 
is important because the border conflict is anchored within the development of the EPLF as well 
as the problematic relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia. These aspects provide information 
required for rightly interpreting the theory. In particular, for Isaias’s weakening position as a leader 
over time and for the exogenous shock, which are explained in subparagraphs 3 and 4.  
 
2.1 Historical Development EPLF 
 
Ethiopia is one of the world’s oldest nation-states, whether it be under the rule of different empires. 
During different periods of history, Ethiopian empires occasionally covered the territories that 
form the current Eritrean state. However, in 1969 these territories became an official Italian colony. 
Although, the boundary with Ethiopia was still not fully demarcated, or at least, not brought into 
practice.  
 When the Second World War broke out, the Italians were ousted by the British (1941) and 
Eritrea became a transitional military administration. In 1952, as supported by a UN-Commission, 
Eritrea formed a federation with Ethiopia. Unfortunately, Ethiopia’s emperor at that time, Haile 
Selassie, broke up the federation and incorporated Eritrea as a new province in 1962 (Murphy et 
all, 2013: 6-9).  
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 Almost inevitably, this movement by Ethiopia was met with resistance from the Eritrean 
side. As an expression of disagreement, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) emerged, which 
started organising insurgencies and other hostilities to the Ethiopian regime. However, it soon 
became clear that the ELF experienced several problems. These included an ambiguous attitude 
towards non-Muslim recruits8, conservative opinions and policies, and weak leadership.  
 When Isaias joined the ELF in 1966, he immediately recognised the problems and he 
became suspected of rebellious activities. As a result of this, in 1966, Isaias was sent to China for 
military training by means of removing him from the ELF.  
 However, during his stay in China Isaias was inspired by Marxist ideas9. When he returned 
to Eritrea, he organised a clandestine gathering, which was the initial step in launching a 
nationalistic party. This party formed the basis for the EPFL, which was officially established in 
1977. Although Isaias’ leadership was not uncontested during the first years of the party, he 
managed to become the leader of both the party and the liberation front.  
 As the EPLF and the ELF could not resolve their problems, they both resorted to violence. 
This ended when the EPLF managed to drive the ELF out of the country in 1981. From then on, 
the EPLF was the main actor in the liberation war against the Ethiopian regime (Connell, 2001: 
346-360). During this liberation war, the EPLF emphasized the Eritrean national feeling and the 
importance of Eritrean unity in order to legitimise their violence (Tronvoll, 2009: 409-411).  
 In the early years of its existence, the EPLF had developed itself to an extremely well-
functioning party. Features of the party included an excellent organisation and communication 
network, strong leadership from Isaias, outstanding military operations and strategies, and 
dedication from all its members. To remain on this high level of party-functioning, strict measures 
were needed as well as great commitment to the leader of the party, Isaias. These measures were 
justified as it was assumed that this was needed to win the war.  
 In 1989, the nationalistic party ceased to exist because there was no longer any need for 
two parties as the party and the liberation front had come together. Because of this change, the 
leadership of the EPLF tried to transform itself from a small elitist party into a nationalistic mass 
movement. However, this became problematic because nationalistic feelings were not widespread 
                                                          
8 The original members of the ELF were predominantly Muslims. 
9 This complicates the situation because the Derg was also Marxist. Nevertheless, Isaias continued fighting against 
the Derg because his party was predominantly driven by nationalistic feelings; he aimed for Eritrean self-
determination.  
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among the Eritrean people (Gilkes, 1999: 12-15). Furthermore, no collective leadership emerged, 
as most leading troops had not survived the war.  
 Nevertheless, the party was still perceived as promising. This was confirmed when the 
EPLF and the TPLF won the war against the Ethiopian government in 1991.This was an 
extraordinary achievement given that they fought with an army of approximately  three million 
troops against 50 million Ethiopians.  
 Therefore, when Eritrea became de jure independent in 1993, many people, both within 
Eritrea as abroad, had good faith in Isaias’ leadership. International observers believed that Isaias 
belonged to a new generation of African leaders, who were supposed to transform their countries 
into peaceful, prosperous and democratic states (Plaut, 2002: 119-120). To show his good 
intentions, Isaias even changed the EPLF in 1994 into the People’s Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ) (Connell, 2001: 360). However, in the years following the independence war, these 
dreams quickly disappeared. This is explained after an elaboration on the historical relationship 
between the EPLF and TPLF.  
With regard to Chiozza’s and Goemans’ theory, it is important to keep in mind that in the 
years during and immediately after the independence war, Isaias’ position was very stable and 
positive since he was supported by many people.  
 
2.2 Historical Relationship EPLF & TPLF 
 
The EPLF was not alone in its liberation war against the Ethiopian government. Instead, the party 
worked together with the TPLF because they both fought against the same enemy, the Ethiopian 
government. Furthermore, both parties speak a common language, Tigrinya, while the official 
Ethiopian language was Amharic. The TPLF, led by Meles, would become the main actor in the 
Ethiopian government after the liberation war and also Eritrea’s enemy in the border conflict. 
Therefore, it is important to examine their turbulent relationship.  
 After the collapse of the Haile Selassie’s regime and the turnover to the Derg, the TPLF 
looked to the EPLF for inspiration and assistance. In particular, they needed the EPLF’s technical 
expertise to survive. To this end, they sent several members to the EPLF to be trained. This 
appeared to be crucial for their war and, hence, they continued sending members. In the 1980s, the 
TPLF were sending, on average, 3000 recruits per year. The TPLF needed the specialised, 
technical skills of the EPLF as well as their organisational policies (Young, 1996: 107-112). 
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Therefore, the EPLF became the ‘senior partner’ in the relationship, which resulted in a discourse 
in which the EPLF was superior to the inferior TPLF.  
 However, despite their close cooperation and their common objective of overthrowing the 
Derg, deep ideological and political differences existed between the two parties. The main 
differences included the TPLF’s idea that all Ethiopian nationalities had the right to independence. 
On the other hand, the EPLF argued that this right was only reserved for the Eritrean people. 
Another major difference was that the TPLF insisted on a hard line against the Soviet Union, 
whereas the EPLF rejected this act. Furthermore, and important for the issue of the thesis, the 
TPLF raised question about the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Reid, 2001: 386-390).  
 Over the course of the liberation war, the TPLF had developed itself. Therefore, their 
confidence increased and they began to challenge the superior status of the EPLF on a range of 
military and political issues. These included the style of fighting, recruitment procedures, and the 
prisoners of war. The EPLF was not pleased with the TPLF’s suggestions and in 1985 the tensions 
between the two parties escalated into a break. According to the TPLF, the EPLF broke the 
relationship because their superior attitude could not accept the TPLF as equal partners.  
 However, as both parties had pragmatic leaders, they resolved their conflict in April 1988. 
The resolution was based on the grounds of both parties still having the same objective; to 
overthrow the regime of the Derg. The EPLF and TPLF compromised about their objectives as 
they agreed on a condemnation of both superpowers and the TPLF backed down on the statement 
of self-determination (Young, 1996: 107-118).  
 Despite this solution, much remained unspoken. The TPLF wanted to discuss the matters 
of disagreement publicly, but the EPLF chose to remain silent. This can be considered as evidence 
for the EPLF’s superiority complex and their problems accepting the TPLF as equal partners. In 
summary, the EPLF, was simply not prepared to take into account the TPLF’s opinion (Reid, 2003: 
390-393).  
 Regardless these problems, when the liberation war ended in 1991 and Isaias and Meles 
both became head of their respective countries, the two states developed a warm relationship. This 
resulted in several pacts and treaties among the two countries, including the Asmara Pact (Tekeste, 
1997: 175-177) and the Treaty of Friendship and Coordination. Plans for more cooperation on 
economic, political, cultural, and security aspects were made. Furthermore, personal friendship 
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existed between the leaders of both sides. This relationship was expressed in frequent visits 
between Isaias and Meles (Villicana et all, 2006: 559-560).  
 Hence, integration between Eritrea and Ethiopia became the final goal. Or, as stated by the 
Eritrean ambassador to Ethiopia “forming an independent state was never the ultimate goal of our 
long struggle” (The Reporter, 1996) 
 However, despite their close cooperation and their gratefulness to the EPLF, the TPLF 
became annoyed by the EPLF’s assumption that they were still the senior partner. This was even 
emphasized by Meles, who was normally very close to the EPLF (Gilkes, 1999: 14-19). This 
superiority-inferiority discourse would cause more problems, as is explained in the remaining part 
of the thesis.  
 The historical development of this relationship is important for the outbreak of the conflict 
in two ways. Firstly, tensions between the two existed already for a long time. Secondly, and 
probably even more importantly, the historical development shows that the EPLF perceived 
themselves as the superior actor, and, furthermore, that they valued this position. This superior 
position had a positive effect on Isaias’ and the EPLF’s feeling of security over their position. 
According to the theoretical framework, because Isaias was feeling secure about his position in 
office, he was less likely to initiate a conflict at that time. 
 
Image 2: timeline development EPLF and its relationship with the TPLF 
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3. Eritrea: a state in decline 
 
Despite good intentions, it became clear in the years after the liberation war that Eritrea was not 
on track to become the promised well-functioning democratic state. Instead, Eritrea was 
considered to be one of the most authoritarian states in the world, in which all power was centred 
around Isaias himself. As is captured by Connell “the overriding problem in Eritrea today is the 
concentration of power in the hands of one man…President Isaias and the PFDJ maintain an 
absolute monopoly on all forms of political and economic power” (2005: 235). For Isaias, this 
resulted in a change from being perceived as an excellent leader towards a failing and egoistic 
leader. It is possible this change affected his sense of security during his tenure in office. Therefore, 
according Chiozza and Goemans’ theory, this insecurity could have been an incentive for initiating 
an international conflict to protect his position in office.  
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 Initially, Isaias was assumed to be interested in democracy, or at least, ‘guided democracy’ 
(2011, 419-424). However, his opinion quickly changed and he argued that the Western democracy 
did not suit a country like Eritrea. Therefore, he blocked the establishment of any real legal 
institution and, instead, he kept all the power to himself. In Table 2 a list is shown with examples 
of institutions that directly fell under Isaias’ rule.  
Furthermore, the process of writing the Eritrean constitution was postponed and when it 
eventually was finished in 1997, Isaias immediately dismissed it. There have been two attempts to 
organise elections, however, these have been cancelled for unknown reasons.  
This implies that institutions had almost no influence in the Eritrean society. Isaias’ 
preferences and personal relationships with the Eritrean people were more important. These 
relationships with Isaias were characterised by force and coercion (Ogbazghi, 2015: 2-5). In a state 
with no strong institutions, a forcible removal from office is much more likely than a regular 
removal from office. This means that a forcible removal suited the situation in Eritrea, which 
implies a higher incentive for a leader to wage an international conflict.  
 Moreover, Isaias’ power was not limited to only the State’s institutions; he determined all 
social, economic, and cultural aspects. Isaias was firstly concerned with embedding the legacy of 
the independence war in all aspects of life. This expressed itself in imposing strict measures and 
high discipline into all daily activities. Furthermore, it implied a strong hierarchy and absolute, 
unchallenged power for Isaias himself.  
 Furthermore, it meant a continuation of the norms and values important during the 
liberation war. This implied that ‘national unity’ was considered as the most important principle 
to which all other policies must be aligned. This was also stipulated in the National Charter.  
 Therefore, the National Charter left no space for other groups. These groups included other 
political parties, but also ethnic, religious, regional, and language groups. These minorities were 
excluded from society and their rights were being denied. They were heavily discriminated, which 
resulted in violent, unlawful practices, even including unwarranted prisoning, torture, and killings 
(Tronvoll, 2009: 409-411).  
 Isaias pursued to achieve this high level of national identity through different means. For 
example, the obligation for all men, and later all women, between 18 and 40 years old, to serve the 
National Service for at least 18 months, although it was constantly extended. In the military, these 
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people became drilled with strict measures and a feeling for hierarchy. Also, some may argue that 
a national identity was being imposed on them (Gilkes, 1999: 12-15).  
 Furthermore, Isaias pursued a radical social transformation, inspired by the Maoist school 
in China. This implied that the agriculture, of which 80% of the Eritrean people was dependent on, 
was determined by the state through a communist system (Ogbazghi, 2002: 5-6). This social 
mobilisation served the dual goal of contributing to the national consciousness as it forced citizens 
to give in to Isaias’ demands (2015: 475-79).  
 Furthermore, in his aim to achieve national unity, Isaias strived for a state of self-reliance. 
Therefore, he rejected foreign aid and assistance, even in times of economic deterioration and 
famine. As the country was not ready to be self-sufficient, it suffered deeply because of this policy.  
 The results of these policies and ideas were questionable as they led to a decline in both 
economic and social aspects. Hence, in order to be allowed to continue executing this strategy, it 
was imperative for Isaias to remain in the centre of power so enabling him to decide all policies 
himself. Isaias justified his dictatorship by the weakness of Eritrea. Therefore, the state of fragility 
benefited Isaias’ authoritarian regime (Connell, 2011: 419-424). 
 As it had become so important for Isaias to remain in charge of all power, he became 
extremely concerned with opposition. In particular, he became concerned with ‘removing’ his 
suspected opposition and critics. ‘Removing’ could have different meanings, such as prisoning, 
execution, and work in labour camps. Hence, Isaias strictly controlled all political activities, the 
civil society, and the media.  
 To start with the political opposition, as there was only one political party, the PFDJ, there 
was no official political opposition within Eritrea. Furthermore, Isaias had dismissed all the 
important people around him. A common tactic to do so became ‘freezing’. This meant that the 
respective individual was stripped of his functions, however, not being formally removed (Hedru, 
2003: 440-444). In this manner, Isaias created a situation in which he alone formed the top of the 
country.  
 Regarding the civil society, multiple mass organisations existed during the liberation war 
to support the war activities. When the war ended, Isaias did not abolish these organisations, but 
transformed them into channels of state mobilisation and promotors of national unity (Ogbazghi, 
2002: 9-11).  
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 Finally, the media was fully in hands of the state and there was no form of free press. The 
news was mainly concerned with Isaias himself and there were multiple shows that were 
completely devoted to him. Furthermore, the United States and Ethiopia were being scapegoated 
in the media. This ‘resulted’ in a first place on the Human Rights Watch’ list of ‘worst places for 
journalists’ (2015: 480-482).  
 Obviously, this all led to a decline of the superior status that Isaias had achieved during his 
performance in the liberation war. Therefore, it would be logical to assume that the Eritrean people 
were criticizing and even rejecting Isaias. Unfortunately, it is hard to examine whether there was 
resistance and opposition within Eritrea as they must work in secrecy (IR Office ELF-RC, 1997). 
Hence, it is unclear if there was political opposition against Isaias within Eritrea.  
This is problematic for the theoretical framework in which this thesis is embedded as the 
theory emphasizes the important role of opposition for the outbreak of an international conflict. 
However, the theory does not only focus on domestic opposition within the country itself, but also 
recognises the importance of domestic opposition organised abroad.  
 
3.1 Opposition abroad 
 
In the years prior to the border conflict, large opposition organisations existed abroad. All these 
opposition organisations had the same objective: to overthrow Isaias’ regime. Although there are 
no sources10 in which Isaias admitted that he was concerned about these groups, it would be logical 
to assume that it made him insecure about his position and the continuation of his tenure. The 
existence of these opposition groups combined with a deteriorating situation in Eritrea, made his 
position more vulnerable.  
 In the 1990s, the headquarters of these groups were mostly based in Ethiopia and Sudan, 
but their influence and support networks were scattered all over the world. For many of these 
groups, their continuation, organisation, members, and the cooperation with other groups were 
unclear and undefined. This was also their main problem; they were too disorganised to form a 
strong block against Isaias (Connell, 2011: 425-427).  
                                                          
10 At least, to my knowledge. 
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This disorganisation makes it difficult to clearly map these groups. This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that much information on these groups is in non-Western languages. 
However, Table 3 provides a summary of the most important groups.  
One of the main opposition groups active in the 1990s were the remnants of the ELF. These 
remnants were split up in different factions, of which the most important include the ELF, or: 
Abdalla, led by the well-known Abdalla Idris, the ELF-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC), under 
the leadership of Ahmed Nasser, and the ELF-CC, also called Sagem, based in Ethiopian Tigray 
(NOREF, 2015: 2).  
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Another faction of the former ELF aimed to move away from the Marxist orientation and 
instead pursued an Islamic discourse. In 1988, they established the Eritrean Islamic Jihad 
Movement (EJIM). This faction had its main base in Sudan and was patronised by Osama bin 
Laden, as is described by Connell (2011). The movement became involved in insurgencies against 
the Eritrean government between 1994 and 1997. Over time, the EJIM split up again and separate 
factions emerged, including the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement (Islah) and Eritrean Islamic 
Party for Justice and Development (al-Khalas) (Connell, 2011: 425-427).  
In addition to these political opposition groups, there were many Eritrean diaspora 
organisations and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These organisations 
focussed on human rights in Eritrea and/or raising awareness for Eritrea in the international 
community. These groups were mainly based in Europe and North-America (Ogbazghi, 2015).  
 
Although the opposition groups and other international organisations must have increased 
Isaias’ insecurity, two other minority opposition groups emerged shortly before the outbreak of 
the conflict.  These groups, namely the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO) and the 
Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunama (DMLEK), added even more 
pressure to Isaias’ position.  The reason for this is that these two groups were established with the 
assistance of the Ethiopian government and were headquartered within Ethiopia.    
Furthermore, Isaias suspected them of having ties with the Ethiopian government that could 
negatively influence his position in office (NOREF, 2015: 2-3). 
Moreover, the two groups resisted Isaias’ rule and were 
campaigning for either another leader or an independent territory 
for the minority group. Therefore, these two parties provide an 
incentive for Isaias to attack Ethiopia, as he could then finally 
deal with RSADO and DMLEK. This also corresponds with the 
theory, as it fits the ‘fighting for survival’ mechanism: a leader 
uses international conflict to directly deal with opposition groups 
that have gathered abroad.         
An important anecdote that strengthens this argumentation, is that the town of Shiraro was 
one of the most contested areas during the border war. The area included the refugee camp Wa’ala 
Nihibi, that hosted many Kunama refugees. This observation advocates for the idea that Isaias used 
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the border conflict to get rid of his opposition (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
2003). This idea is further substantiated by the following arguments.  
 
4. Changing Balance EPLF – TPLF  
 
Before continuing this analysis, it is useful to dwell on the existing situation in the period right 
before the border conflict. Isaias’ status had quickly deteriorated from a great leader during the 
liberation war to a failing dictator in the years after Eritrea’s independence. Furthermore, 
opposition to his regime existed abroad, in particular the opposition parties RSADO and DMLEK. 
These parties were supported by the Ethiopian government. It is likely to assume that Isaias started 
to question the security of his position in office.  
 The theory of Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argues that when in such a scenario an 
‘exogenous shock’ emerges in favour of the opposition groups, it might trigger a leader to initiate 
a war. In practice, a corresponding exogenous shock is hard to appoint, but this thesis focuses on 
the changing (economic) balance between the Eritrean and Ethiopian government and the 
consequences this had for Isaias and his regime.  
 As already mentioned in the paragraph ‘Historical development of Eritrea (EPLF) and its 
relationship with Ethiopia (TPLF)’, the EPLF was conceived as the senior partner in the 
relationship with the TPLF during the independence war. This is because they were the party with 
the military and technical expertise, resources, and organisation skills. However, over the course 
of the war, the TPLF started to develop itself. When the independence war ended, this development 
even accelerated as the TPLF became the core of the ruling political coalition party of Ethiopia, 
the EPRDF11.  
 Ethiopia had clearly more power than Eritrea in terms of economy, military, and 
international influence. Therefore, the EPRDF turned into the more powerful and successful actor, 
instead of the EPLF. As Eritrea was facing many problems in the 1990s, this led to a decline of 
Isaias’ position: he was not only the leader of an unsuccessful state, he was also overtaken by the 
EPRDF, which used to be the inferior player.  
                                                          
11 As the EPRDF became Ethiopia’s ruling party, the next paragraph refers to the EPRDF. However, as the EPRDF 
was almost completely determined by the TPLF, this in practice meant the TPLF.  
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 Firstly, Ethiopia is not only geographically a much bigger country than Eritrea, but it has 
also a much bigger population. In 1997, the year before the outbreak of the border war, 
approximately 60,893,264 individuals lived in Ethiopia versus 3,260,612 people in Eritrea.  
 Furthermore, the Ethiopian economy was much bigger than the Eritrean economy. 
Ethiopia’s GDP in 1997 was estimated to be $8,589 billion, whereas Eritrea’s GDP did only make 
it to $686 million (Worldbank, 2016). In addition to this, although both the economies were deeply 
integrated, Eritrea was more dependent on Ethiopia than the other way around. This was because 
Eritrea had only few exportable resources and, therefore, needed to import many products from 
Ethiopia, including food. As counterpart, Eritrea argued that they had the ports of Massawa and 
Assab as baits for landlocked Ethiopia. However, Ethiopia could rely on alternative options, such 
as the port of Djibouti (Tekeste, 1997: 175-177).  
  Furthermore, although the United States, the most important power in the 1990s, supported 
both countries, they had clearly more interest in Ethiopia. This interest was based on a previously 
successful partnership between the two states and the potential dominance of Ethiopia in the Horn 
of Africa. (Woodward, 2006: 84). In addition to this, the United States’ opposition to the Eritrea 
self-determination had caused a more problematic relationship with Eritrea (Metafaria, 2000: 86) 
and because Eritrea valued their self-reliance (USAID, 2016). Therefore, Ethiopia received more 
aid from the US and became more credited by the international community than Eritrea.  
 Moreover, as the EPRDF had become head of state in Ethiopia, they were in control of the 
Ethiopian National Defence Forces. This meant that they had a much bigger and better army than 
the EPLF, as can be seen in Table 4. This was extremely painful for the EPLF, as they were 
previously valued for their effective army.  
 Finally, Ethiopia experienced improvements in education as government investments in 
education increased and access to education had improved (Woldemikael, 2003). Instead, 
education in Eritrea, focused on creating national consciousness. 
 To conclude, during the 1990s it became impossible for the PFDJ to retain their superior 
position. This became even more visible during the years’ prior the outbreak of the border conflict 
and, therefore, even more challenging for Isaias’ position as leader.  
 This had become more visible due to important changes in economic issues. Firstly, Eritrea 
refused to keep using the Ethiopian birr, as this did not suit their policy of self-reliance. Therefore, 
they introduced a new currency, the ‘nakfa’, which they wanted to be on par with the birr. 
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However, as Ethiopia did not accept this, the nakfa currency soon sank under the birr. Therefore, 
Ethiopia demanded to do trade in hard currency, but, as Eritrea had only little of hard currency 
(Woodward, 2006: 86), this quickly became problematic for the trade between the two countries.  
 Next to this, the favourable position of Eritrea on the trade balance between 1993 and 1996 
disappeared in 1997, as is described in Table 5. It was clear that Ethiopia stood to gain (Villicana 
et al, 2006: 560-562). This was even more painful because Ethiopia was experiencing a 
considerable growth of 5.6% in GDP between 1996 and 1997. Furthermore, Eritrea had 
outstanding financial debts to Ethiopia (Addis Tribune, 1998), although, this is challenged by the 
Eritrean government itself.  
 Finally, Eritrea pushed its policy of self-reliance even further in 1997, as they started to 
refuse to accept foreign aid. This was very problematic given that the Eritrean society was heavily 
dependent on foreign aid (USAID, 2016).  
 To conclude, the EPRDF (and thus the TPLF) had become the more important partner in 
the relationship with Eritrea, instead of the other way around. This was even more clearly 
expressed during 1997, the year before the outbreak of the war. As the EPRDF backed the 
opposition groups RSADO and DMLEK, the EPRDF’s change to being the more powerful partner, 
reinforced the position of these two groups.  
Hence, an ‘exogenous shock’ – the change in the balance of the relationship – favoured the 
opposition, as is according to Chiozza’s and Goemans’ theory. Therefore, they became a bigger 
challenge to Isaias’ position in office. This combined with his deteriorated status and, hence, the 
need to prove his capabilities, could likely have been the incentive to go to war against Ethiopia.  
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the outbreak of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998 
by using the insights derived from the theory of Chiozza and Goemans (2011). Chiozza and 
Goemans state that in a situation in which a leader faces opposition over his power and an 
exogenous shock favours the position of the opposition, the respective leader might choose to use 
international conflict to either directly fight his opposition or to seek other gains from the conflict. 
As is often the case in International Relations, the theory did not neatly fit the situation, but it 
certainly did provide interesting insights on the conflict, as is summarised in this conclusion.   
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  Before an in-depth application of the theory to the outbreak of the conflict, it was 
imperative to highlight the complex beginning of the war by showing that Eritrea started the 
conflict by launching a major attack on 12 May 1998. However, it is also important to keep in 
mind that this vision requires some nuances as Ethiopia showed itself prone to war as well.  
 By exploring the history of the EPLF and its relationship with the TPLF, it became clear 
that in their initial cooperation during the liberation war, the EPLF was considered as the ‘senior 
party’. This resulted in a discourse in which the EPLF was conceived as the superior actor as 
opposite to the inferior TPLF. Since the EPLF was established along strict hierarchical lines, Isaias 
formed the crown on of a superior organisation. Therefore, when the liberation war ended and 
Eritrea finally gained its independence, many Eritrean people, as well as the international 
community, received Isaias as the promising leader. People hoped that Isaias would bring Eritrea 
the prosperity and peace for which it had fought so hard.  
 Unfortunately, these hopes disappeared quickly when Isaias turned out to be a failing 
dictator, as opposed to the promising leader many had expected. He turned Eritrea into a strict 
authoritarian state, subjected to his own arbitrariness. Almost no legislation or effective institutions 
existed. According to the Chiozza and Goemans’ theory, such a situation means that there are no 
institutions that could guarantee a safe retirement after losing office. This implies that when Isaias 
had to leave office, he would face a forcible removal rather than a regular removal.  
Moreover, Isaias was mainly concerned with national unity and he aimed to transform the 
state through radical reforms. He harshly repressed all forms of criticism. Therefore, it became 
impossible to organise official political opposition within Eritrea. However, foreign opposition 
groups emerged sharing the same objective to overthrow Isaias’ regime. In particular, the minority 
parties RSADO and DMLEK emerged just before the outbreak of the war, which were both 
supported by Ethiopia.  
 Despite that there are no sources12 which confirm the following assumption, it would be 
logical to conclude that Isaias became insecure about his position in office due to these two 
developments. The situation, therefore, corresponds with the starting position of the Chiozza’s and 
Goemans’ theory; a situation in which a leader is insecure over his position in office due to 
opposition, whilst he is not being protected by institutions that guarantee a safe retirement.  
                                                          
12 At least, to the author’s knowledge 
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 An important change in this relationship even reinforced these developments. As the TPLF 
had become the head of the Ethiopian government, they had become more powerful and successful 
than the EPLF. This became clear in 1997, due to the introduction of the nakfa, adversely affecting 
the trade balance for Eritrea, and the rejection of foreign aid by Eritrea. Therefore, the EPLF was 
forced to give away its superior status to the TPLF. 
 As RSADO and DMLEK were supported by the Ethiopian government, this also implied 
that these opposition parties were supported by a power that had visibly changed into the more 
successful actor. This could be considered as the ‘exogenous shock that favours the opposition’ 
and, hence, as an incentive for Isaias to initiate a war with Ethiopia.  
 Chiozza and Goemans’ theory is, therefore, applicable to the situation, implying that Isaias 
initiated the border conflict to deal with his domestic opposition. In this case, this could either be 
through means of showing his capabilities as a leader in war or by directly addressing the 
opposition that had settled in Ethiopia.  
 
 However, although the theory does provide some interesting insights on the border conflict 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it is also necessary to ask some questions on the implications of the 
conclusion.   
 Firstly, the theory presents this cause assuming that it was the only factor that triggered 
Isaias to initiate the border conflict. However, as is shown in the ‘State of Research’, other authors 
appoint different aspects as being the cause of the war, which are also plausible. Since reality is 
always more complex than just one theory and given the multidimensional nature of the conflict, 
it would be wise to not consider this idea as the incentive for the war, but rather as an important 
incentive among others.  
 Furthermore, although it is likely that Isaias would have felt insecure in his position in 
office in the described circumstances and that he would have used the border conflict as a means 
to regain security over his tenure, it is impossible to provide evidence for this assumption. There 
are no sources in which Isaias confirms this idea, and even if there were, it would then still not be 
sure if he had spoken the truth.  
 Next to these two aspects that are relevant for Chiozza and Goemans’ theory in general, 
there are also two issues that are problematic for the application of the theory on this case in 
specific. First and foremost, it is ambiguous to assign the change of the balance between the EPLF 
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and TPLF as a ‘shock’. Although indeed important phenomena happened in 1997, it might be 
better to consider this change as a longer process, which already had started during the liberation 
war.  
  Therefore, the thesis does not fully succeed in filling the gap mentioned in the ‘State of 
Research’, as it still fails to sufficiently explain why the conflict emerged at the moment it did. It 
might be concluded that the outbreak of the conflict was based on a build-up of several aspects. A 
comprehensive research project is necessary to confirm this hypothesis. 
Another problematic aspect is that the thesis treats the outbreak of the conflict as if it was 
completely Eritrea’s ‘fault’. However, the reality is more nuanced and the input of the Ethiopian 
side requires further research. 
 
However, despite these important shortcomings, the theory provided a refreshing angle to 
the study of the conflict by focussing on the individual leader and his aim to stay in power. This is 
especially relevant in this conflict as Isaias was able to almost completely determine Eritrea’s 
policies regarding the conflict. 
Finally, as the thesis uses a relatively new theory, this must only be considered as the initial 
steps of a new approach to the border war. Therefore, more research is required to further examine 
the issues addressed in this thesis. This may include in-depth analysis of Isaias, domestic 
opposition, the relationship between the domestic opposition, Isaias and Ethiopia, the Eritrean 
superiority complex, the balance between the TPLF and EPLF, and so on. 
 
~ END ~ 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Interview with Habtom Yohannes (Eritrea) – in Dutch 
 
Je kunt het niet los zien van de geschiedenis. Het concept “Historical institutionalism” is bij dit 
conflict erg belangrijk. Wat er in het verleden gebeurt, beperkt onze kijk op het heden. Maar ook 
hoe de verhoudingen tussen ons liggen en hoe we met elkaar omgaan. Als je niet met een fris idee 
komt, zal je doorgaan op de manier die door het verleden is bepaald. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan 
is de Qwerty theorie. We blijven in het verleden hangen, omdat de elites hier profijt van hebben. 
Ook al is de elite zelf hier ook ten dele de gevangene van.  
De grens tussen Ethiopië en Eritrea is niet door de koloniale machten doorgetrokken. De 
machthebbers uit Ethiopië en Eritrea komen uit een en hetzelfde volk. Daarom hoeven we geen 
conflicten met elkaar te hebben. Voordat de Italiaanse kolonisten kwamen, behoorde Eritrea tot 
Ethiopië. De Eritrese Tigrinia sprekers trainde de Ethiopische Tigrinia sprekers, die nu de 
machthebbers in Ethiopië zijn. Voorheen waren juist Eritrese Tigrinia sprekers dominanter dan de 
Ethiopische. In Eritrea zijn negen bevolkingsgroepen, waarvan de Tigrinia sprekers de meest 
dominante groep is.  
In de koloniale tijd is de grens doorgetrokken door de Italianen, Britten, Fransen en 
Ethiopiërs (keizer Menelik, Amhara). In deze tijd was Tigray het machtigste gebied van de streek. 
Dit kwam, omdat naar dit gebied het Christendom in de derde eeuw na Chr. zich had gevestigd. 
Er was grote rivaliteit tussen de Tigray sprekers en de Amhara. Het verhaal gaat dat keizer Menelik 
het op een akkoordje heeft gegooid met de Italianen om de grens door het Tigray gebied te laten 
lopen. Zo kon hij de macht van Tigray in tweeën splitten. O.a. Menelik’s vrouw beschrijft dit in 
haar boek.  
De Tigrayers in Ethiopia zijn altijd onderdrukt geweest. De Ethiopische Tigrayers bedelde 
zowel in Eritrea als Ethiopië. Daarom hebben de Ethiopische Tigrayers een inferioriteit complex. 
Voor de Eritrese Tigrayers is dit juist andersom: zij hebben een superieuriteit complex. De Eritrese 
Tigrayers moesten de Ethiopische Tigrayers namelijk altijd helpen en trainen tijdens de 
onafhankelijkheidsoorlog. Daarom ‘verbazen’ de Eritrese Tigrayers zich erover dat de groep die 
zij altijd moesten helpen, nu juist oorlog met hen voert. Dit is te zien in bijvoorbeeld 
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oorlogsliederen; deze liederen zijn doorspekt met het verschil tussen het inferioriteit complex van 
de Ethiopische Tigrayers en het superioriteit complex van de Eritrese Tigrayers.  
Er was dus altijd grote rivaliteit tussen Eritrese Tigrayers en Ethiopische Tigayers, ook 
toen ze samen vochten. We waren altijd bang dat de Tigrayers onderling oorlog zouden voeren 
tijdens de onafhankelijkheidsoorlog. Dit kwam door verschillende belangrijke gedachtes: 
Ethiopisch Tigray twijfelde of zij ook onafhankelijk wilde worden of dat ze bij Ethiopië wilde 
behoren. Eritrea vond dit heel gek. Ethiopisch Tigray was namelijk geen voormalig kolonie. Een 
onafhankelijk Tigray zou ingaan tegen de ‘heilige’ afspraak van de Afrikaanse Unie dat de grenzen 
overeen moeten komen met de koloniale grenzen.  
Ethiopië is onderverdeeld op grond van etnische afkomst. In de grondwet is vastgelegd dat 
iedere bevolkingsgroep het recht heeft om af te scheiden. De TPLF heeft dit in de grondwet 
ondergebracht als veiligheidsventiel: mocht het niet goed gaan in Ethiopië, dan kan Tigray zich 
afscheiden. Het grote probleem hierbij is echter dat Tigray dan geen toegang tot de zee heeft.  
Eritrea mocht de Ethiopische Birr gebruiken en de Ethiopiërs mochten op hun beurt de Eritrese 
haven gebruiken. Dit ging in het begin heel goed, er was zelfs een security pact. Echter, in Eritrea 
was een grote zwarte markt in de Birr, waardoor je in Eritrea veel meer voor de Birr kon krijgen 
dan in Ethiopië. Dit was een doorn in het oog voor de Ethiopiërs. Daarnaast dreef Eritrea nog meer 
handel op slinkse manieren. In de beginjaren konden de Ethiopiërs niets tegen deze praktijken 
doen, omdat ze van hun veiligheid afhankelijk waren van Eritrea.  
Tijdens de onafhankelijkheidsoorlog konden beide partijen het zich niet veroorloven om 
ook nog over Badme oorlog te voeren.  
Volgens de EECC (die erg goed werk heeft gedaan) is Eritrea de oorlog begonnen. Eritrea 
stelt echter dat dit slechts een verdediging was, die nodig was omdat Ethiopia (als eerste) 7 Eritrese 
officiers had gedood.  
De elite heeft een oorlog kunnen uitlokken om de macht.  
Er was grote spanning tussen de twee landen om economische redenen. Dit kwam o.a. door 
de introductie van de Nacfa in 1997 door Eritrea. Eritrea had een grote arrogantie en stelde dat 1 
Nacfa gelijk stond aan 1 Birr. Ethiopia wilde dit niet goedkeuren en besloot daarom alleen nog 
maar met dollars handel te willen drijven. Er kon geen overeenkomst worden gesloten tussen 
Ethiopië en Eritrea. De bevolking aan de grens werd hier het slachtoffer van; zij konden geen 
handel meer drijven.  
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De oorlog was aanvankelijk een geheim van de elites. De Ethiopische Birr die aanwezig 
was in Eritrea, verloor zijn waarde door de oorlog. De Ethiopische goederen die op dit moment in 
de haven van Assab aanwezig waren, werden door Eritrea geconfisqueerd. Daarnaast werden 
Eritreeërs die in Ethiopia waren, door Ethiopië naar Eritrea gedeporteerd.  
De oorzaak van de oorlog is: economisch, psychologisch, historisch, maar er waren ook externe 
factoren.  
Het ging namelijk deels ook over de politieke hegemonie: wie had het in de regio voor het 
zeggen? Dit was deels een interne strijd, maar ook extern: Amerika heeft belangen in de regio. 
Amerika verkiest Ethiopië boven Eritrea; dat was vroeger zo, maar nu nog steeds. Een voorbeeld 
hiervan is dat de Verenigde Naties een keer een internationaal verdrag wilde openbreken in het 
voordeel van Ethiopië. Dit staat in dit boek: John Bolton: surrender is not an option p. 347/348.  
Amerika besteed ‘regional security’ uit. In de hoorn van Afrika besteed Amerika dit uit aan 
Ethiopië. Alle landen moeten daarom Ethiopië gehoorzamen, maar Eritrea doet dit niet.  
 
Leiders 
Meles’ moeder komt uit Eritrea, zijn vader uit Tigray. Meles wilde de oorlog met Eritrea juist niet. 
Hij heeft geprobeerd de deportatie van Eritreeërs uit Ethiopië tegen te houden. Maar de radicalen 
binnen de TPLF beschuldigden hem ervan dat hij de oorlog niet wilde, omdat zijn moeder uit 
Eritrea komt. Binnen de TPLF waren veel hard-liners; Meles had veel tegenstanders. Meles had 
ook tegenstand van buiten de TPLF, bijvoorbeeld fanatieke Amhara, maar de heftigste tegenstand 
kwam van binnenuit de partij. Ethiopië is ‘verlicht autoritair’. Overal waar Ethiopische belangen 
worden vertegenwoordigd, zijn vertrouwelingen van de TPLF.  
In Eritrea is daarentegen sprake van een keiharde eenpersoon dictatuur.  
 
Het conflict is niet enkel ontstaan door de spanningen; de leiders hebben zelf ook iets 
persoonlijks aan het conflict toegevoegd. Dit moet onderzocht worden binnen het ‘structure & 
agency’ framewerk. Wat is de invloed van structuren en wat is de invloed van actoren? In het geval 
van Issaias, was de invloed van de actor groter: Issaias speelde een belangrijke rol in het ontstaan 
van het conflict. In Ethiopië was het eerder andersom: de structuur was belangrijker. Er waren 
hard-liners binnen de TPLF die Meles onder druk zette om de oorlog te gaan voeren.  
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Suggestions 
Patrick Cammaert, leider van UNMEE.  
Aregawi Berhe, a political history of the tigray people’s liberation front (oprichter TPLF) 
Belangrijk boek:  
John Young – The Tigray and Eritrean peoples liberation fronts: a history of tension and 
pragmatism.  
Menelik’s vrouw - boek 
John Bolton: surrender is not an option p. 347/348. 
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Appendix 2: Interview with Gizachew Soboksa (Ethiopia) 
 
Introduction 
I will ask you a few questions about the start of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia between 
1998 till 2000 because I am writing my master thesis about this topic. Do you mind that your 
personal details, like your name, etc. will be in my thesis? 
 
Personal information 
1. Name and age 
Gizachew Soboksa, 28 
2. Association 
Community association, founded in 1998 (when the war began), to bring the Oromo people 
in the Netherlands together, he is the Secretary (since one year), their task is to work on 
the integration of Oromo people in the Netherlands (they give the people trainings to give 
them capacity) and focussing on human rights in Ethiopia (by demonstrating in the Hague 
and other places where important people are, they demonstrate in groups from 100 to 500 
people), They also organize women days, kids days, sport days, etc.  
 
Questions regarding the start of the war 
1. Could you explain the start of the war for me? 
G was 11 years old when the war start, so his experience and knowledge is from his dad 
and from what he read and heard. The war started in 1998, May. Eritrea had issues with 
Ethiopia. Eritrea wanted to be independent, but they felt like Ethiopia was still colonizing 
them. So, they had an issue with the Ethiopian state and therefore they wanted to “liberate” 
themselves.  
The Mengistu regime was very brutal – you were killed if you did not listen to them. This 
suppression was especially severe in Tigray. So the EPLF and TPLF collaborated to bring 
down this regime. But Eritrea still did not want to become part of Ethiopia and they asked 
for a referendum. In this referendum a vast majority of the people voted for independence 
and hence they got their independence.  
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However, at the time of the start of the war, the power balance between the EPLF and 
TPLF started to shake. Before the TPLF got the power in Ethiopia, they were always 
independent of Eritrea, but this changed when they came into power. Eritrea has only a 
few people and has few resources and therefore they became less powerful. Though, they 
wanted their powerful position back and hence they decided to invade Ethiopia, the area 
of Badme in specific. That was very easy for the Eritreans since there were not much armed 
Ethiopians in Badme by that time, it was 150.000 armed Eritreans against 15.000 armed 
Ethiopians. Therefore, the Eritreans succeeded in invading Badme.  
2. Who do you think was more aggressive in the beginning of the war, Eritrea or Ethiopia? 
Obviously the Issaias regime because they had the power at that moment (there were more 
 armed Eritreans than Ethiopians by that time).  
a. Who started shooting? 
3. Which side was more open towards peaceful negotiations? 
At the beginning, Issaias was not ready to start negotiations because he thought he could 
easily annex the country by force. So, he first wanted war to try to annex the country. When 
he had successfully invaded Badme, he was open to negotiations in order to really get the 
area. This was because he was smart, he namely had another base: the colonial map. 
According to the colonial map, Badme was part of the Italian colony (and therefore from 
Eritrea), so he could win the negotiations.  
 
Questions regarding the motives 
1. Why do you think violence was being used?  
This is because the egoistic nature of Issaias, because of his aim to show his personal 
power. However Badme indeed belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia assumed the area was theirs. 
This was because this always had remained vague. By using violence, Issaias wanted to 
show his power to the TPLF regime, to shake the power balance again in order to regain 
his favourable position in this power balance.  
2. Why did they care so much about the border and Badme? 
Badme is not full of resources and hence Issaias had not to worry that people would have 
accused him of invading because of the rich resources. Therefore this area could be used 
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to show that Eritrea was a powerful state in the region. Eritrea wanted to show they were 
powerful.  
3. Do you think Eritrea invaded Ethiopia?  
a. Or do you think Eritrea just retook that what already was Eritrean territory? 
Badme belongs to Eritrea, because of the colonial map.  
4. Were there other issues next to the border conflict? Which issues?  
a. Were there any other factors that could trigger a conflict? 
There were a lot of factors. Especially from Issaias’ point of view. Eritrea had paid too 
much for their independence (a very long heavy war). But, in the period after their 
independence, 1993 till 1998, the Eritrean country was not what the Eritrean people had 
hoped for and it was not for what they had fought (it was very poor, badly governed, etc.). 
Therefore, Issaias had to find a reason so that he could fight again, Issaias needed to 
reassert his power. The vast majority of the problems nowadays is because Issaias needed 
to reassert his power. Issaias had to show he was a good leader, but occupied by something 
else (like war) so he had no time to handle the problems inside the country.  
 
Questions regarding the regime type 
About Ethiopia/Eritrea 
1. Which regime type did the country have at the time of the conflict? 
Both were authoritarian. G does not know much about Eritrea, but only about the. 
Ethiopian side. From 1991 till 1995 there was a transition government. At the end of 
1992/start of 1993, the TPLF (which was a minority) side lined the other parties (for 
example the OLF). So, they kicked out the Oromos, whereas this is not democratic since 
the Oromos are the biggest group in the country. Ethiopia was completely authoritarian, 
they orchestrated, they made up stories about the Oromo party. They are telling they are 
democratic, but in practice they are not. For Eritrea, it is the same story. They are now 
saying: “We don’t need elections, we only need to develop our country now”.  
2. How were the political institutions? 
It was the same for both sides, they both came from a long war and therefore they were not 
ready to rule the country. They did not have the knowledge and the capacity to govern a 
country.  
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The TPLF was the most powerless party when they came into power. Besides, they did not 
have much resources, because there are not much resources in Tigray. Next to this, when 
the TPLF was founded, they did not want to rule Ethiopia, they only wanted Tigray to be 
independent. So, in the first place they did not want to govern Ethiopia. They were only 
concerned with making Tigray more resourceful with the resources from the rest of 
Ethiopia. When they had done that, they thought they might be able to rule Ethiopia, but 
they were still doubtful. Only when they found out there was not much resistance from 
other parties, they decided they wanted to rule Ethiopia.  
Already, in the beginning, the EPLF and the TPLF did not really want to be together. 
Eritreans had already developed their own identity and therefore they wanted their own 
independent country.  
3. If there would be a change of leaders, how would this process have had taken place? 
Before the war, both countries had a big chance to become more democratic, but Meles 
Zenawi and Issaias thought that guns were more important. Also OLF did something 
wrong, they did not fought hard enough for the democracy. All the leaders were ‘gun-
minded’ instead of being ‘peace-minded’.  
 
Questions regarding the state 
From Ethiopian side, Meles was not sure of his position in that time. His party splitted in two - 
Meles argued they need the war. Meles had to reassure his position. There were a lot of problems 
in Ethiopia, such as the party split, ideological split in the party. In order to tackle this problem, 
Meles had to reassure his position.  
